Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral Judgments.

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics.

Social influence and social identity: A diffusion model analysis.

Building on the seminal studies of Solomon Asch and Muzafer Sherif, recent research has advanced our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social influence by applying a diffusion model analysis. Here, we combined the social identity approach to social influence with a diffusion model analysis to unravel the mechanisms underlying social influence. In particular, we aimed to disentangle whether the difference between in-group and out-group influence on perceptual decision-making is driven by a judgmental bias (i.e., changes in decision criteria) or a perceptual bias (i.e., changes in the uptake of sensory information). Preregistered analyses indicated that in-groups exerted stronger social influence than out-groups because in-groups induced a stronger perceptual bias than out-groups. This finding is in line with the single process assumption of the social identity approach because it implicates that the single process driving social influence (i.e., self-categorisation) translates into a change in a single subprocess of decision-making (i.e., biased information uptake). In conclusion, our results highlight that our theoretical understanding of social influence can be expanded by integrating the social identity approach with a diffusion model analysis.

Social norms shape visual appearance: Taking a closer look at the link between social norm learning and perceptual decision-making.

One of the most fundamental questions in social psychology is whether norms can change individuals' minds by shaping the visual appearance of stimuli. This question was first raised by Muzafer Sherif (1935). Drawing on the extended social reinforcement account (Germar and Mojzisch, 2019), we aimed to provide a rigorous test of the hypothesis that norm learning leads to a persistent perceptual bias and, hence, to a change in the visual appearance of stimuli. From a methodological perspective, we used both a diffusion model approach and the method of adjustment, a well-established technique from psychophysics and vision research. The results of Experiments 1-3 show that norm effects on perceptual decision-making are robustly replicable, and are due to genuine social influence, that is, they cannot be explained by non-social priming, contingency learning effects (Experiments 1 and 2) or anchoring effects (Experiment 3). Most importantly, by using a psychophysical approach, Experiment 4 shows, for the first time, that social norm learning alters individuals' point of subjective equality and, hence, the visual appearance of stimuli.

Social norm learning alters feature-based visual attention: Evidence from steady-state visual evoked potentials.

Dating back to the seminal studies of Sherif (1935), there is robust evidence that social norm learning is able to shape perceptual decision making in a persistent manner. But what mechanisms underlie this effect? Here, we propose the new attentional alignment hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, norm learning alters feature-based visual attention. In particular, we hypothesize that norm learning increases visual attention toward norm-congruent relative to norm-incongruent stimulus features. Using steady-state visual evoked potentials, our results show for the first time that norm learning can persistently alter early attentional processes in the visual cortex. As predicted by the attentional alignment hypothesis, individuals' feature-based attention was tuned toward norm-congruent and away from norm-incongruent features. This bias persisted even when norm information was no longer available. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Social norm learning from non-human agents can induce a persistent perceptual bias: A diffusion model approach.

Seminal studies on social influence (Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1935) were based on face-to-face interactions between humans. Nowadays, computer-mediated communication is steadily becoming ubiquitous, and we are increasingly influenced by non-human agents, such as algorithms, robots, and chatbots. The present research aimed to answer two important questions: Can non-human agents exert social influence in a persistent manner and, thus, contribute to the emergence of social norms? And if this is the case, is social influence exerted by non-human agents mediated by the same or by different cognitive mechanisms as social influence exerted by human agents? To answer these questions, we used an online version of an established paradigm in research on social norm learning. To examine the cognitive underpinnings of social influence, we used a diffusion model approach. Our results provide strong evidence for the notion that non-human agents can induce persistent social influence outside an immediate group context and, hence, can contribute to the emergence of social norms. Furthermore, results from our diffusion model analyses support the notion that social influence exerted by non-human agents is mainly mediated by the same cognitive mechanisms as social influence exerted by human agents.

People perceive themselves to adhere more strictly to COVID-19 guidelines than others.

People have a fair idea of how they are supposed to behave to slow down the spread of COVID-19. But what about people's perception of their own compared to others' adherence to the guidelines? Building on prior research on self-enhancement biases, we predicted that people perceive themselves to adhere more strictly to the COVID-19 guidelines than others. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a large-scale online experiment (N = 1,102), using a sample from four countries (UK, US, Germany, Sweden). As predicted, people perceived themselves to adhere to the COVID-19 guidelines more strictly than both the average citizen of their country and their close friends. These findings were robust across countries. Furthermore, findings were not moderated by whether people first thought about themselves or about others. In conclusion, our study provides a robust demonstration of how a long-standing psychological effect perseveres, even during a once-in-a-lifetime health crisis.

Identification and location tasks rely on different mental processes: a diffusion model account of validity effects in spatial cueing paradigms with emotional stimuli.

Spatial cueing paradigms are popular tools to assess human attention to emotional stimuli, but different variants of these paradigms differ in what participants' primary task is. In one variant, participants indicate the location of the target (location task), whereas in the other they indicate the shape of the target (identification task). In the present paper we test the idea that although these two variants produce seemingly comparable cue validity effects on response times, they rest on different underlying processes. Across four studies (total N = 397; two in the supplement) using both variants and manipulating the motivational relevance of cue content, diffusion model analyses revealed that cue validity effects in location tasks are primarily driven by response biases, whereas the same effect rests on delay due to attention to the cue in identification tasks. Based on this, we predict and empirically support that a symmetrical distribution of valid and invalid cues would reduce cue validity effects in location tasks to a greater extent than in identification tasks. Across all variants of the task, we fail to replicate the effect of greater cue validity effects for arousing (vs. neutral) stimuli. We discuss the implications of these findings for best practice in spatial cueing research.

The Cognitive Underpinnings of Option Generation in Everyday Life Decision-Making: A Latent Variable Analysis.

The ability to generate options for action is crucial for everyday life decision-making. In this article, we propose and test a model of the cognitive underpinnings of option generation in everyday life situations. We carried out a laboratory study using measures of a wide range of cognitive functions and asked participants (N = 157) to generate options for actions for different everyday life decision-making scenarios. The results of a latent variable analysis show that the cognitive underpinnings of option generation are consistent across different everyday life situations and, hence, option generation can be conceptualized as a general construct. Moreover, the results of a confirmatory factor analysis reveal that, when controlling for the shared variance among the cognitive processes assessed, verbal fluency, working memory capacity, ideation fluency, and processing speed predicted option generation. These findings suggest that option generation in everyday life situations can be distinguished from other cognitive constructs, such as divergent thinking (in terms of ideas' originality) and long-term memory.

Dogs (Canis familiaris) stick to what they have learned rather than conform to their conspecifics' behavior.

In recent years, an increasing number of studies has investigated majority influence in nonhuman animals. However, due to both terminological and methodological issues, evidence for conformity in nonhuman animals is scarce and controversial. Preliminary evidence suggests that wild birds, wild monkeys, and fish show conformity, that is, forgoing personal information in order to copy the majority. By contrast, chimpanzees seem to lack this tendency. The present study is the first to examine whether dogs (Canis familiaris) show conformity. Specifically, we tested whether dogs conform to a majority of conspecifics rather than stick to what they have previously learned. After dogs had acquired a behavioral preference via training (i.e., shaping), they were confronted with counter-preferential behavior of either no, one or three conspecifics. Traditional frequentist analyses show that the dogs' behavior did not differ significantly between the three conditions. Complementary Bayesian analyses suggest that our data provide moderate evidence for the null hypothesis. In conclusion, our results suggest that dogs stick to what they have learned rather than conform to the counter-preferential behavior of others. We discuss the possible statistical and methodological limitations of this finding. Furthermore, we take a functional perspective on conformity and discuss under which circumstances dogs might show conformity after all.

Social conformity is due to biased stimulus processing: electrophysiological and diffusion analyses.

Hundreds of studies have found that humans' decisions are strongly influenced by the opinions of others, even when making simple perceptual decisions. In this study, we aimed to clarify whether this effect can be explained by social influence biasing (early) perceptual processes. We employed stimulus evoked potentials, lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) and a diffusion model analysis of reaction time data to uncover the neurocognitive processes underlying social conformity in perceptual decision-making. The diffusion model analysis showed that social conformity was due to a biased uptake of stimulus information and accompanied by more careful stimulus processing. As indicated by larger N1-amplitudes, social influence increased early attentional resources for stimulus identification and discrimination. Furthermore, LRP analyses revealed that stimulus processing was biased even in cases of non-conformity. In conclusion, our results suggest that the opinion of others can cause individuals to selectively process stimulus information supporting this opinion, thereby inducing social conformity. This effect is present even when individuals do not blindly follow the majority but rather carefully process stimulus information.

Social influence and perceptual decision making: a diffusion model analysis.

Classic studies on social influence used simple perceptual decision-making tasks to examine how the opinions of others change individuals' judgments. Since then, one of the most fundamental questions in social psychology has been whether social influence can alter basic perceptual processes. To address this issue, we used a diffusion model analysis. Diffusion models provide a stochastic approach for separating the cognitive processes underlying speeded binary decisions. Following this approach, our study is the first to disentangle whether social influence on decision making is due to altering the uptake of available sensory information or due to shifting the decision criteria. In two experiments, we found consistent evidence for the idea that social influence alters the uptake of available sensory evidence. By contrast, participants did not adjust their decision criteria.